That Cabinet Manual in full
Iain McLean |
Some Conservatives have accused the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Gus O'Donnell, of stacking the deck against them by insisting that Gordon Brown remains Prime Minister until he gives up trying to form a coalition, thus giving him the first move. Others, notably Professor Peter Hennessy, insisted through the night that that was "the British Constitution". Who is right?
On the narrow point, Hennessy is right. Back in February 2010, Prime Minister Brown asked Sir Gus to prepare a Cabinet Manual to cover the unwritten conventions of government formation and behaviour. Sir Gus took the New Zealand version as a basis. He presented a draft chapter dealing with hung parliaments to the Justice Select Committee of the Commons in February. That document represented the British Constitution as at 6 May 2010. By 7 May it had arguably changed again with Nick Clegg's Friday-morning announcement that David Cameron's plurality of votes and seats gave Cameron, not Brown, the first-mover advantage: that is, the right to make the first attempt to form a government.
Nevertheless the manual is important, especially by comparison with what came before. Here are two key paragraphs:
18. A Prime Minister may request that the Monarch dissolves Parliament and hold a further election. The Monarch is not bound to accept such a request, especially when such a request is made soon after a previous dissolution. In those circumstances, the Monarch would normally wish the parties to ascertain that there was no potential government that could command the confidence of the House of Commons before granting a dissolution.
19. It is open to the Prime Minister to ask the Cabinet Secretary to support the Government's discussions with Opposition or minority parties on the formation of a government. If Opposition parties request similar support for their discussions with each other or with the Government, this can be provided by the Cabinet Office with the authorisation of the Prime Minister.
Paragraph 18 resolves a very unsatisfactory situation. Previously, the only authoritative statement on the Monarch's right to refuse a dissolution was made anonymously by the king's private secretary in an anonymous letter to The Times in 1950:
Dissolution of Parliament
Factors in Crown's choice
Sir,-- It is surely indisputable (and common sense) that a Prime Minister may ask - not demand - that his Sovereign will grant him a dissolution of Parliament; and that the Sovereign, if he so chooses, may refuse to grant this request. The problem of such a choice is entirely personal to the Sovereign, though he is, of course, free to seek informal advice from anybody whom he thinks fit to consult.
In so far as this matter can be publicly discussed, it can be properly assumed that no wise Sovereign - that is, one who has at heart the true interest of the country, the constitution, and the Monarchy - would deny a dissolution to his Prime Minister unless he were satisfied that: (1) the existing Parliament was still vital, viable, and capable of doing its job; (2) a General Election would be detrimental to the national economy; (3) he could rely on finding another Prime Minister who could carry on his Government, for a reasonable period, with a working majority in the House of Commons. When Sir Patrick Duncan refused a dissolution to his Prime Minister in South Africa in 1939, all these conditions were satisfied: when Lord Byng did the same in Canada in 1926, they appeared to be, but in the event the third proved illusory.
I am &c., SENEX.
April 29.
This is extraordinary. The part I have italicised suggests that some parts of this constitutional convention are to be withheld from the vulgar eyes of the lower classes. The paragraph also suggests that the Monarch's advisers are qualified to decide whether an election would be detrimental to the economy. The writer's only professional qualification was that he had been an unsuccessful stockbroker before becoming a courtier. Compared to that, Sir Gus's chapter is a breath of fresh air - and democracy.
Both paragraphs of Sir Gus's memo show that civil servants and courtiers have learnt, as they had not in 1950, that if the monarchy is to survive, it must not be a back stop in the case that politicians fail to agree. To do that means, as Prime Minister Asquith magisterially but unavailingly wrote to the meddling George V in 1913, that 'the Crown would become the football of contending factions. This is a Constitutional catastrophe which it is the duty of every wise statesman to do the utmost in his power to avert.'
So far, Sir Gus and the three party leaders have all avoided constitutional catastrophe. To that extent British politics has grown up since 1913.
Please note: Views expressed are those of the author.About the author
